讲座题目🧘🏻♂️：PAMA: A Proactive Approach to Mitigate False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids 主讲人：Rongxing Lu（Assistant Professor） 主持人🦞：曹珍富 教授 开始时间：2019-05-21 13:30:00 开始时间☂️：2019-05-21 15:00:00 讲座地址🍤🧎🏻♂️：中北校区数学馆201 主办单位🤜🏽：计算机科学与软件工程学院
报告人简介：
Rongxing Lu (S’99-M’11-SM’15) has been an assistant professor at the Faculty of Computer Science (FCS), University of New Brunswick (UNB), Canada, since August 2016. Before that, he worked as an assistant professor at the School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore from April 2013 to August 2016. Rongxing Lu worked as a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Waterloo from May 2012 to April 2013. He was awarded the most prestigious “Governor General’s Gold Medal”, when he received his PhD degree from the Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering, University of Waterloo, Canada, in 2012; and won the 8th IEEE Communications Society (ComSoc) Asia Pacific (AP) Outstanding Young Researcher Award, in 2013. Also, Dr. Lu received his PhD degree at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China, in 2006. He is presently a senior member of IEEE Communications Society. His research interests include applied cryptography, privacy enhancing technologies, and IoT-Big Data security and privacy. He has published extensively in his areas of expertise (with citation 15,000+ and H-index 61 from Google Scholar as of May 2019), and was the recipient of 9 best (student) paper awards from some reputable journals and conferences. Currently, Dr. Lu currently serves as the Vice-Chair (Publication) of IEEE ComSoc CIS-TC (Communications and Information Security Technical Committee). Dr. Lu is the Winner of 2016-17 Excellence in Teaching Award, FCS, UNB. 报告内容： The pervasiveness of information and communications technologies as well as intelligent electronic devices leads to an expanded attack surface in smart grids, making it increasingly challenging to withstand the high-profile false data injection (FDI) attacks. In this talk, we discuss a proactive approach to mitigate FDI attacks (PAMA) in smart grids. With PAMA scheme, the critical information - power grid connections and configurations as well as the original measurement data - used for constructing FDI attacks is well protected from leakage or theft, so that FDI attacks are effectively mitigated. Specifically, we transform the state estimation and FDI detection application into a distributed one equipped with converted information from the critical information provided by the control center. In addition, the original measurement data is also protected by using a secure hybrid Paillier cryptosystem. Our PAMA scheme is proved to be secure and effective in mitigating FDI attacks on smart grids. The computational complexity and the communication overhead are evaluated on the standard IEEE 14-bus test system. |
